Thermodynamic Realism Term

Thermodynamic Realism - Coined January 17, 2026

Thermodynamic Realism

Coined by Andraž Đurič · January 17, 2026
Definition

The philosophical position that normative claims (ethical, epistemic, aesthetic) reduce to descriptive facts about entropy management and information-theoretic constraints faced by self-maintaining systems. Under thermodynamic realism, persistent patterns must align internal models with external reality to minimize energetic costs of misalignment, thereby grounding ethics in physics rather than convention.

This post establishes priority for the term "Thermodynamic Realism" as a named philosophical position.

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